# 2. Governance reform to free With us from dominance of founding family

With us founding family (Horikawa) seriously confounding private and public interests



#### 2. Governance reform to end dominance of founding family **Founding Family Seriously** 2-1 **Confounding Public/Private Interests**

Channeling excessive profits to the founding family hinders the growth expected of listed company, which prevents realization of the common interests of shareholders.

**1.** Privileged position & remuneration given to founding family

2. Family members in concurrent directorships with rival companies

**3. Effective distribution of profit to founding family** 

4. Anti-takeover measures effectively protect founding family

Need to end control by founding family, which conflates private & public interest (see slide 34)







### How Founding Horikawa Family 2-2 **Treats With us as Personal Property**

- through 2015. He retains advisory role even after resigning his directorship.
- son Akito serves as director of a With us subsidiary.
- specifically for Akito separate from main strategy division

Voting rights held by founding family

20.02%



### Kazuaki Horikawa

221,000 shares (2.45% voting rights)



#### **Naoto Horikawa**

468,200 shares (5.18% voting rights)

Source: With us securities reports, company registration data, discussions with With us Note: Percentage of voting rights rounded to two decimal places

Kazuaki Horikawa founded With us in 1976, served as president through 2009, then as chairman

Kazuaki's eldest son Naoto Horikawa currently serves as executive officer of With us. His second

Akito is responsible for strategic planning, directly under President Ikoma, in position created



# Hint and Hit Co., Ltd. **Rep. Director: Kazuaki Horikawa**

653,000 shares (7.23% voting rights)







# **Privileged Position Given to Founding Family**



2-3





Source: Company materials, conversation with With us Corporation


2. Governance reform to end dominance of founding family





#### **Founding Family Treat** 2-4 **Subsidiaries as Private Property**

- are followed every year".



President Ikoma defends Kazuaki and Naoto Horikawa's long-standing appointments as subsidiary company presidents, saying they are the "right people for the right positions, and that proper appointment processes

However, earnings do not suggest that Kazuaki & Naoto Horikawa have improved subsidiary corporate value

over past 16 years



#### 2. Governance reform to end dominance of founding family **Monopolizing Positions Because of** 2-5 **Being the Family Member, Not Business Aptitude**

Naoto Horikawa appears keen to leverage his SRJ presidency in external activities, but his contribution to earnings is unclear, with no sustainable growth shown

#### 教育アライアンスネットワーク新理事長に SRJ 堀川直人代表が就任

2022-09-01

5年目を迎えたNEAは、新体制で次のステージ/



2018年の発足から5年目となるNFAが、会員同士の関係性 体制で次のステージを構築していく。今後の方向性や展望に を伺った。

歩踏み込んで寄り添い身近に必要とされる組織に





10月3日。火曜日は「キムタツ×ひーぷーのオキナワ・ジモトーク」放送日である。一昨年9月27日からスタートし た同番組もいつまで続けさせてもらえるんだろうと思っていたら先ごろ1周年を迎え、現在は来年1月までのゲ

沖縄に縁とゆかりのある方をお迎えし、その方の人生を振り返りながら沖縄の今を見つめようというトーク番 組である。いろんな方々の過去を振り返ることで現在の沖縄の姿が見えてくるんじゃないかというコンセプトで

No sustainable growth for SRJ


Unclear earnings contribution from external activity





## 2-7 **¥1.5mn per Month Advisory Fees Over Past 9 Years**

nine years from the month since his resignation as director. This is essentially the same as the average salary of an executive officer.



Notes: ¥13.5mn advisory fee for FY3/16 is for nine months after resignation from July 2015 through March 2016 (¥1.5mn per month) Sources: With us Corporation Securities Report

2. Governance reform to end dominance of founding family

Kazuaki Horikawa has been paid ¥1.5mn per month (¥18mn per year) in advisory fees over the








## **Founding Family in Concurrent** 2 - 8**Directorships with Rival Companies**

- He also served as an external director of a rival company while director of a With us subsidiary.
- litigation from parties related to both companies.
- could create a hesitancy to execute optimal strategies at the current company.



Naoto Horikawa was appointed as an officer of a rival company after resigning from With us.

Serving as director of two rival companies over a short term invites suspicion of the misuse of confidential information, ideas, or knowhow, even if unintended, and could create risk of

Indeed, taking care to avoid the misuse of information or knowhow obtained in a prior position










### **Founding Family in Concurrent** 2-8 **Directorships with Rival Companies**

- services.



Moreover, Naoto Horikawa has served for 16 years as president of a consolidated subsidiary SRJ, which offers IT-based education serves, but until end-Feb. also served as NED of Wingnet, a consolidated subsidiary of rival Ichishin HD that offers IT-based education


It is possible that Horikawa would hesitate to roll out optimal IT-based services at With us owing to the concurrent directorship of two companies that could launch rival services.





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2. Governance reform to end dominance of founding family

# **Effective Distribution of Profit to Founding Family**


Naoto Horikawa, eldest son of founder, held 14.0% stake in With us subsidiary Terrace 1.





# 2-9 **Effective Distribution of Profit to Founding Family**

- converting from 77.4%-owned subsidiary to wholly owned.
- Horikawa.



Sources: With us Corporation 3Q FY3/24 quarterly report; Shareholding percentages for Naoto Horikawa & other shareholders based on SRJ Notification of establishment of interim holding company via share transfer

2. Governance reform to end dominance of founding family

In Oct 2023, With us obtained remaining 22.6% of voting rights of Terrace 1 for ¥580mn,

In this way, ¥359mn of profit belonging to the Company ended up being paid directly to Naoto

Terrace 1 was established in Dec 2019 as an interim holding company for SRJ (IT-based educational program development and supply) and Revic Global (corporate training).

At establishment, main shareholders were With us, Naoto, Ichishin HD, and Z-Kai HD. On 1 Oct 2023, With us obtained all stock it did not yet hold and turned company into 100% subsidiary.

### Such channeling of profit to individuals casts doubt on compliance with listing criteria









# 2-9 **Effective Distribution of Profit to Founding Family**

shareholders do not need to know).

Our conversation with With us President Ikoma (21 Mar 2024)



STRATEGY

Why did Naoto Horikawa personally hold 14% of Terrace 1 stock? Ordinarily the employees of a listed company would not hold shares in a consolidated subsidiary.

**Terrace 1** is the interim holding company for SRJ and Revic Global. The decision was taken, it's as simple as that and I see no need to keep going on about the reasons for it. Of course I know (the reasons), as I was involved (in the decision). But I will refrain from comment as I have nothing to say about it. The reason I have nothing to say is that <u>I concluded it was appropriate</u>. The reason I concluded it was appropriate is because I thought it was appropriate.

2. Governance reform to end dominance of founding family

In discussions with GES on 21 Mar 2024, With us President Ikoma refused to explain why Naoto Horikawa personally held the shares (President Ikoma knows the reason, but claimed



President Ikoma










#### 2-10 Summary


# The shareholder proposal must be passed to end control by the founding family, who conflate private and public interests.

**1. Special privilege & remuneration** given to founding family

2. Founding family in concurrent directorships with rivals

**3. Effective distribution of profit to** founding family








# 3. Promotion of constructive dialogue with shareholders

Aiming to raise corporate value at With us by promoting constructive dialogue with shareholders



## 3-1 **Promoting Constructive Dialogue with Shareholders**


GES repeatedly requested meetings with With us directors, but was consistently rejected. Listed companies with dispersed ownership are at risk of sloppy management; it is in the common interest of all shareholders that larger holders represent multiple small shareholders in individual meetings with directors.



- Shareholders own the company, and through general meetings of shareholders appoint directors to whom they entrust the duties of management. Management may not necessarily be effective, so shareholders must be ready to promote discipline.
- For listed companies with dispersed ownership, it is not feasible for small shareholders to take the time and expense needed to promote managerial discipline, which can lead to lax management being left unchecked.
- In economics, the name given to ineffective management by those to whom shareholders have entrusted managerial responsibility is the "agency problem". It can result in irresponsible management being left unchecked when ownership is dispersed.
- By standing in for small shareholders and taking the time and expense required to engage in constructive dialogue through private meetings, large shareholders can promote discipline and improve corporate value, which benefits all shareholders. Therefore, large shareholders taking the initiative to talk with management contributes to the common interests of shareholders.


















# The shareholder proposal must be passed to promote constructive dialogue with shareholders.

**1. Promote constructive dialogue with shareholders** 

#### Shareholder proposal

#### Description

**Resolution 7** 

Ensure transparency of management through inperson discussion with shareholders



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#### About Global ESG Strategy


Global ESG Strategy ("GES"), an investment fund that is managed by SAFS, makes medium- to long-term investments from an ESG (Environment, Social and Governance) perspective, and its policy is to promote improvements on enterprise value and shareholder value of investee companies through constructive dialogue with investee companies and other means.

#### About Swiss-Asia Financial Services Pte Ltd.

SAFS is founded in 2004, and is a Singapore based investment management company that holds a Capital Markets Services (CMS) License under the Singapore Securities and Futures Act (SFA).

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